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The Uncanny Swipe Drive: The Return of a Racist Mode of
Algorithmic Thought on Dating Apps
As algorithmic media amplify longstanding social oppression, they also seek to
colonize every last bit of sociality where that oppression could be resisted. Swipe
apps constitute prototypical examples of this dynamic. By employing protocols
that foster absent-minded engagement, they allow unconscious racial preferences
to be expressed without troubling users’ perceptions of themselves as non-racist.
These preferences are then measured by recommender systems that treat
“attractiveness” as a zero-sum game, allocate affective flows according to the
winners and losers of those games, and ultimately amplify the salience of race as
a factor of success for finding intimacy. In thus priming users to disassociate their
behaviours from troubling networked effects, swipe apps recursively couple their
unconscious biases with biased outcomes in a pernicious feedback loop. To resist
this ideological severing of the personal from the networked, this paper analyses
interviews from fifty online daters through a lens formulated as the “uncanny
user unconscious.” This lens allows for the affective registration of abhorrent
modes of distributed thoughts disavowed by the very users they are created from
and coupled with. It may thus afford those seeking more ethical protocols of
engagement some purchase on the all too familiar biases some algorithms both
amplify and repress.

The Uncanny Swipe Drive: The Return of a Racist Mode of
Algorithmic Thought on Dating Apps
Introduction
As scholars decry algorithmic oppression with increasing alarm, they also describe it as
colonizing every last bit of sociality where it could be resisted. Swipe apps constitute a
prototypical example of this development. By employing protocols that foster absentminded engagement, they allow unconscious racial preferences to be expressed without
troubling users’ perceptions of themselves as non-racist. These preferences are then
measured by recommender systems that treat “attractiveness” as a zero-sum game.
Distributing digital traces of desire according to the winners and losers of those games,
they then amplify the salience of race as a factor of success for finding intimate
connections. So by allowing users to disassociate their behaviours from networked
effects, swipe apps are able to recursively couple their unconscious biases with those
effects in a pernicious feedback loop.
To resist this severing of the personal from the networked, I analyse fifty
interviews of online daters through a lens I call the “uncanny user unconscious.” This
lens situates the disavowed digital traces Patricia Clough has formulated as the “user
unconscious” within Sigmund Freud’s understanding of the uncanny: an ominous
foreboding stemming from the imminent return of traumatic thoughts “long familiar to
the psyche” but “estranged from it” via repression (Clough, 2018a; Freud, 2003, p.
148). This lens will hopefully allow scholars, users, and creators to affectively register
abhorrent modes of distributed thought disavowed by the very users they are created
from and coupled with. Gaining purchase on the all too familiar biases platforms both
amplify and repress might then allow more ethical protocols of engagement to be

delimited, sought out, and devised. This theoretical lens is described in more detail
following the literature review below.

Literature review: racial bias in algorithmic media and dating platforms
Racial bias in algorithmic media
Much has been written about the amplification of inequality through algorithmic media
(Pasquale, 2016; Srnicek, 2016). Deemed “weapons of math destruction” (O’Neil,
2016), “artificial unintelligence” (Broussard, 2018), “algorithms of oppression” (Noble,
2018), and the “new Jim Code” (Benjamin, 2019), they seem to be turning every last bit
of life into digital grist for the analytic gaze of big data (Beer, 2018; Couldry & Mejias,
2019). The amplification of racial bias is central to many of these critiques of
algorithmic media (Benjamin, 2019; Cheney-Lippold, 2017; Couldry & Mejias, 2019;
Noble, 2018; O’Neil, 2016).
Noble (2018) shows how Google marginalizes people at the intersection of
oppressions by allowing the porn industry to purchase any keyword it wants. This
amplifies a pornographic white male gaze that views black girls as fetishized sex
objects, mapping “old media traditions into new media architecture” through ostensibly
colour-blind algorithms (2018, p. 24). The circulation of misrepresentative information
of maligned groups in society is thus very profitable for Google. And its racism should
be seen as symptomatic of racial bias deeply embedded within society rather than an
unfortunate glitch. To fix these algorithms of oppression, Noble contends we must
demand greater transparency in how they function. According to her, this would allow
us to “transform the consciousness embedded in artificial intelligence, since it is in fact,
in part, a product of our own collective creation” (2018, p. 29).

Transforming this collective consciousness will not be easy. Indeed, Benjamin
(2019) finds that black people are often disenfranchised by the very tech fixes devised
to benefit them. But she warns we should not see this as a concerted effort by racist
programmers to keep black people down. In fact, the effort to call out individual racism
often distracts us from the slow death perpetuated by “subtler and even alluring forms
of coded inequality” that go on under the radar (Benjamin, 2019, p. 24). A beauty
contest conducted by Beauty AI illustrates this point. Programmed to determine beauty
through pre-labelled images, it ultimately deemed white people to be the most beautiful
because it learned from images labelled by people with racial biases. Thus, we should
strive to make sure the data that machines learn from are unbiased. If they were, AI
could help us “subvert the status quo by exposing and authenticating the existence of
systemic inequality” and, ultimately, allow us to “come to grips with our deeply held
cultural and institutionalized biases” (2019, p. 65).
The transparency and oversight Noble and Benjamin see as solutions to the
problem of anti-black bias in algorithmic media is questioned by Keeling (2019). She
describes the roots of today’s digital inequality as stemming from financial “futures”
devised to protect investments in black bodies during the slave trade. Chattel slavery
should thus be seen as “the foundation for present relations of exploitation and
domination” within today’s economy based on financial speculation (Keeling, 2019, p.
24). Coming to terms with this historical trauma is difficult because multicultural
neoliberalism profits from representations that celebrate racial difference, while
maintaining socioeconomic relations rooted in white supremacy. This makes it clear
that “the benefits of visibility are unevenly distributed” within today’s methods of
measure and recognition (Keeling, 2019, pp. 100–111).

Algorithmic media is also working to colonize every last space where a critique
of it could take place, according to Couldry and Mejias (2019). They explain that data
colonialism has roots going back to the 16th century, but rather than capture populations
and annex territories, it forces sociality through economically exploitable protocols. In
this way, it has supplanted the democratic potential of user-to-user interaction with a
cloud empire. In this empire, users no longer produce or own anything; rather, they rent
data from the cloud while providing it with free data. And as the internet of things takes
over the home for big-data ventures, mobile phones never allow a moment’s reprieve
from corporate surveillance. These new data relations allow media to extract a profit
from people even as their purchasing power has dwindled from decades of neoliberal
policies. The terms digital “natives” and data “mining” render explicit the link between
the cloud empire and datafication, exploitation and machine learning, colonization of
lives and algorithmic speculation. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this
colonization is that corporations now produce the data from which knowledge of the
social is formed. It is thus threatening to fashion knowledge of the world and our
imagination in its own image (Couldry & Mejias, 2019).

Racial bias on dating platforms
Dating platforms have also been critiqued for their racial biases. Studies of dating sites
have found their users have more pronounced racial preferences than their search
criteria would suggest (Alhabash et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014); women return
more messages from men of equal to more desired racial statuses on them; and black
women receive fewer responses on them from everyone except black men (Lin &
Lundquist, 2013; Rudder, 2015). Furthermore, recommender systems can treat new

users who do not have revealed1 preferences as though they are long-term users with
similar profiles (T. Wang et al., 2011). This would make it impossible to circumvent the
racial biases of the entire network of past and present users on dating platforms. It has
also been found that increasing the size of photos on OkCupid amplifies the effect of
“attractiveness” on the number of messages users receive (Rudder, 2015, p. 123). This
indicates that the centrality of images on swipe apps is likely to amplify racial bias on
them because this bias is imbedded in “attractiveness” scores generated from pooled
preferences of online daters. Some have also found that profiles on apps catering to the
LGBTQ community are racist (Hutson et al., 2018). They thus suggest that dating
platforms should carefully consider the categories they allow users to filter for, do a
better job of monitoring messages, and inform users of the detrimental effects of racist
language on profiles (Hutson et al., 2018). While these are good suggestions, they are
unlikely to alter liking and messaging patterns, which are influenced more by
recommender systems than written content on profiles and messages. These suggestions
also do not address the shift from dating websites to apps, where users are increasingly
recommended to each other according to interactive data such as liking and messaging
patterns rather than deliberate search queries and profile descriptions.
This ignoring of the shift to interactive data is largely due to the proprietary
nature of the big data captured by platforms and the algorithms they use to analyse it.
But media scholars have begun interrogating digital platforms through the lens of
algorithmic imaginaries (Bucher, 2017). In these studies, users have been found to alter
their engagement on Facebook and Instagram to ensure their posts are prominently

1

Revealed preferences are “revealed” by liking and messaging patterns of users rather than
what they say they want on profiles or indicate what they want through search criteria.

placed (Bucher, 2017; Cotter, 2019), avoid unwanted connections by not using certain
words and providing screenshots instead of links (van der Nagel, 2018), exchange views
on algorithmic manipulation of users emotions (Hallinan et al., 2020), and make
information about algorithms more widely available (Cotter, 2019). In this way, some
algorithmic imaginaries circumvent platforms’ attempts to strategically disclose how
their algorithms function to some, while hiding this information from others (Cotter,
2019).
While online dating has quickly surpassed other ways of finding sexual partners
(Rosenfeld & Thomas, 2012), with over 40 percent of couples having met online by
2017 (Rosenfeld et al., 2019), the way algorithms on dating platforms make users feel is
unclear. It has been found that couples who met online experience lower rates of
divorce and express more satisfaction than those who met via other means (Cacioppo et
al., 2013). This suggests that the algorithms employed by dating platforms may lead to
better relationship outcomes. But scholars contend there is no scientific evidence that
algorithms can predict compatibility (Finkel et al., 2012; Hitsch et al., 2010; Joel et al.,
2017a). Perhaps, then, it is belief in algorithms that explains these positive outcomes, as
this leads to more personal disclosure and less uncertainty before a date (Sharabi, 2020).
It has also been found that online daters are not usually aware of the precise formulation
of matching algorithms (Sharabi & Dykstra-DeVette, 2019), do not usually take issue
with the way recommendations are made by them (Lorenza Parisi & Comunello, 2020),
and consider them to be innocuous ritual tools, even when problematic historical biases
are embedded in them (S. Wang, 2020).
While the algorithmic imaginary is a way of studying algorithms without having
access to their precise formulation, the critique proposed in this paper builds from a
comparison of OkCupid’s and Tinder’s algorithmic recommender systems. I go into

more detail about these systems in the discussion. But for now, it should be noted that
whereas OkCupid’s Match system assumes idiosyncratic attraction based on many useradjustable variables, Tinder’s “attractiveness” scale assumes attraction to be a universal
quality measurable by the ratio of right to left swipes users receive. I propose that these
differences make Tinder a prototypical platform for understanding the way life and
subjectivity is being appified today, a process which some have argued began around
2010 (Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Light et al., 2016). The transition from OkCupid to
swipe apps that many of my respondents made indicates an acceleration of neoliberal
competition, hierarchization, and control. But it also constitutes a shift form
neoliberalism. This is because entrepreneurs of themselves are less central to today’s
economy. Indeed, the affective flows of communication in today’s mediasphere renders
user rationality tangential, if not largely incompatible, with profit making.
While debates over whether dating apps are superficial (David & Cambre, 2016)
or not (Carpenter & McEwan, 2016; Enomoto et al., 2017; Hobbs et al., 2016) have
been a point of contention, this paper addresses the shift from dating sites to apps in
terms of its impact on race. This shift seems to have created an affective milieu wellsuited for implicit racism to flourish. Implicit racism is an unconscious bias that leads
one to overvalue races that society privileges and undervalue races that society
disadvantages (Dovidio et al., 2016). These unconscious biases become ingrained in
psyches at a young age because of racist media and social structures within the United
States. This unconscious racism is increasingly at odds with the non-racist worldview
that many hold, a disconnect between unconscious and conscious thoughts that has been
called “aversive racism” (Dovidio et al., 2016). Unconscious racism becomes more
pronounced in those with aversive racism when it is easier to discriminate against

certain races without troubling one’s self-image as non-prejudiced. An important
through line in this paper is that swipe apps constitute one such context.
Given this milieu of swipe apps, where unconscious racism can easily become
embedded in coded protocols determining social life and death against users’ wishes, a
framework seems needed to allow users to gain some purchase on how they are being
used by them. To that end, I argue that swipe apps should be seen through the
theoretical lens of the uncanny user unconscious, which I develop below.

Theoretical lens: from the death drive to the uncanny user unconscious
This theoretical lens situates the death drive and biopower within the user unconscious
and, in turn, embeds the user unconscious within the uncanny. It is split into three
sections: first, resonances between biopolitics and the death drive are highlighted;
second, the implications of information theory for understanding the death drive are
outlined; and third, an explanation of the critical import the uncanny lends to the user
unconscious is given.

The origin of processes now animating the unconscious: biopower and the death
drive:
Foucault (1978) described biopower as a transition from governments taking the lives of
subjects to assessing, managing, and orchestrating populations in the 18th century. This
concern with population management – generating, fostering, and optimizing the
workforce – coincided with the bloodiest atrocities ever recorded, from genocidal
conquests to chattel slavery to the Nazi holocaust. This was no coincidence according to
Foucault. The ostensible focus on public health, increasing birth rates, and reducing the
ravages of deceases made genocidal pogroms, medicalized sexuality, and eugenicsbased immigration policies seem natural.

Foucault’s understanding of biopower resonates with the dualistic battle between
life and death Freud proposes in Civilization and its Discontents (2019). In this book,
Freud contends there is an interlinked dynamic between “eros” and “death” that drives
the development of individuals, societies, and the human species. Eros is fairly
straightforward: it looks to foster the life of individuals and the human species through
the libido, causes individuals to come together to propagate, and leads to large groups of
people in civilizations. The death drive is harder to detect: it overrides the pleasure
principle, compels people to repeat past traumatic experiences, and fosters excessive
acts of aggression. Civilization subdues this aggression through the superego, which
creates an overbearing conscience in subjects, forcing them to bottle up aggression in an
unsustainable way. According to Freud, this death drive tends to erupt in mass
destruction when it is not adequately addressed (2019). So just as Foucault details the
atrocities perpetuated by societies ostensibly bent on optimizing life, the death drive
points to repetitive trauma undergirding the more easily discernible forces of “eros”.
Both the “death” drive and biopower can thus be seen as exposing the sordid underbelly
of life.
Dean (2009) has noted the link between biopolitics and the death drive as well.
She claims biopolitics is “a politics of the death drive” because it pulls society out of the
“natural rhythms and processes of organic life” (p. 3). But for Freud, the death drive
pulls society apart as a capitulation to nature, not a transgression of it. That is, it obeys
the second law of thermodynamics, which states that closed systems become
increasingly disordered over time (Tran The et al., 2020). According to Freud, then, life
is an emergent process borne of oscillations between order and disorder. While “eros”
struggles for order against the disorder of the “death” drive, we see life as that which
flourishes above the fray, a lovely ordering of matter into organisms, species, and

civilizations. Freud tells us that just below this façade of life is a morbid force looking
to erupt.
Freud saw the death drive as a strange compulsion that goes beyond the pleasure
principle, but Lacan claims it goes beyond death itself: a “Will to destruction. Will to
make a fresh start. Will for an Other-thing” (1997, p. 212). This positions humans as
creators after the death of god, according to Lacan. He explains that this is an
impressive feat because it is not “difficult to make what is called thought emerge from
the evolution of matter…. What is difficult to make emerge from the evolution of matter
is quite simply homo faber” (1997, p. 214). In this way, Lacan inverts the death drive:
no longer leading to destruction, it becomes the ground of emergence for a godless
homo faber. This inversion is congruent with a paradigm shift that took place in the
interim between Civilization and its Discontents and Lacan’s reading of it quoted above.
I turn to this shift next because it is a crucial link between the user unconscious and the
death drive.

Turning death into life: how disorder became crucial to the creation of new forms
of life in the second half of the twentieth century
While Freud’s model for the death drive was the entropic heat death of the universe, his
model for life was the struggle for homeostasis discernible in the steam engine (Luciana
Parisi, 2004). From this perspective, he saw humans and groups as seeking to maintain
homeostasis in systems constantly threatened with dissipation. This required them to
use external sources of energy without altering their internal function (Luciana Parisi,
2004).
After the turn of the twentieth century, scientific thought began investigating
open systems that did not tend toward homeostasis – in quantum mechanics, chaos
theory, and information theory, for instance. The latter would become central to

cybernetics and our increasingly digital world beginning with Shannon’s formula for
information in 1948. This formula was nearly identical to the one it superseded, except
for one change: the sign preceding it was flipped from negative to positive. This flip
inverted the relationship between entropy and information, altering the way noise,
turbulence, and randomness would be seen thereafter. Rather than the result of
dissipation and portending death, entropy would be seen as the foundation of useful
information and the emergence of life (Clough, 2010, pp. 217–218). Inverting the
relationship between entropy and life made it possible to modulate affect in the
economy because energy could be seen as an always informing and formative measure.
Energy in human bodies could be captured as information, and energy from the
environment could penetrate them in ways that altered their informational substrate
(Clough, 2010, p. 221). In this way, the human body would become an assemblage of
“organic and non-organic life” that goes “beyond the organism as an entropic, closed
system” (Clough, 2003, p. 362).
This shift to modulating affective information coincides with the transition to an
information economy and a mode of production that makes extensive use of affective
labour (Castells, 2009; Hardt & Negri, 2001). But seeing the economy as working
through the modulation of affect in itself rather than affective labour highlights the
becoming independent of affect from individuals (Clough, 2018b).
The transition to modulating affect also coincides with a shift from state-centred
to neoliberal biopolitics (Foucault, 2010). This shift is seen most acutely in America,
where economic rationality would colonize an ever-expanding remit of social life, from
immigration and crime to finding a spouse and raising children. A key difference
between liberals and neoliberals is that the latter no longer saw workers as productive or
unproductive from birth; instead, they saw them as enterprising entrepreneurs of

themselves, susceptible to market-based incentives compelling them to increase their
productivity throughout their entire lives (Foucault, 2010).
As an unalterable, ascribed status, it is hard to see how race could be used as a
locus of incitement for people conceived as entrepreneurs of themselves (Foucault,
2010, p. 228). Moreover, racism is difficult to detect in neoliberal governmentality
because it feels like less of an imposition than previous modes of governance. Instead of
disciplining bodies or internally subjugating individuals, it would optimize “systems of
difference,” tolerate “minority individuals and practices,” and adjusts “the rules of the
game” (Foucault, 2010, p. 260). In other words, neoliberalism uncovers a detailed grid
of behavioural responsiveness to environmental variables that are then calibrated for
profitability (Foucault, 2010, p. 259).
Deleuze has outlined this transition to neoliberalism as one in which power
controls dividuals rather than individuals (1992). Dividuals are datafied fragments of
individuals pulled apart by the intense competition immanent to networked
neoliberalism in “societies of control” (1992). These societies implement a new form of
racism that Clough and Willse call “population racism” (2011, p. 51). No longer
working to control groups of human beings, this racism functions by statistically
organizing and manipulating “groupings of characteristics, features, or parts” through
algorithmic analyses (Clough & Willse, 2011, p. 52). Many of the arguments made
about structural racism embedded in big data colonization (Couldry & Mejias, 2019),
algorithms of oppression (Noble, 2018), and the new Jim code (Benjamin, 2019), which
I outlined in the literature review, confirm this move to modulating parts of datafied
selves (Cheney-Lippold, 2017). While proxies for race are regularly put to use by
algorithms mining vast caches of data, the effects of race on their output becomes
buried in impenetrable jumbles of code (O’Neil, 2016). Crucially, Clough and Willse

explain that this population racism works by calibrating affective milieus to bring about
future effects (2011, p. 53).
To render this notion of affective milieus more concrete, we might think of
affects as strong attractions toward or away from objects (Kernberg, 2009), two states
that coincide with swipe app protocols. The “death” drive can then be seen as working
through swipe apps to compel, amass, and agglomerate these affects – traces of desire
written in binary and from which social life and death are determined. This makes it
clear that speculating algorithms profit from creating affective milieus that facilitate
social connection, engagement, and privilege only against an underlying amplification
of social death. Irreducible to intrapsychic or “interpersonal processes” (Hartman, 2020,
p. 318), this social death is animated by algorithmic assessments of risk that cross
“intra-, inter-, and ultrapsychic registers,” with heightened risk all too often attributed to
non-white users in normatively white collectives (Hartman, 2019, p. 96).
To discern the entanglement of this social death with today’s mode of
algorithmic repression requires a critique that goes beyond the individual subject
(Clough & Johanssen, 2020). Indeed, as algorithms learn by probing noisy data in
search of profitable forms of networked engagement, they break down the bodies,
habits, and rituals of individuals, reconfiguring them as users to surreptitiously
speculate upon (Clough 2018:107). With speculation now central to algorithmic media,
venture capital, and tech start-ups, the conceit that human speculation is the seat and
benchmark of reason in contrast to machinic instrumentalism is troubled. This requires a
reformulation of the mind and its relation to the unconscious (Clough, 2019). I explain
why the uncanny user unconscious should be seen as a critical contribution to that
reformulation below.

The uncanny user unconscious
Clough’s notion of the “user unconscious” goes a long way towards reformulating the
unconscious for today’s speculative data logic (Clough, 2018a). She explains that this
unconscious is now constituted from ubiquitous appeals to you that come from others
on platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. These appeals have led to
communities in which feelings of love and hate, comradery and shame are amplified
(Chun, 2016). But you are not only addressed by others online. You are also addressed
by algorithmic systems allocating access to affective flows of communication: systems
that determine who gets recommended to whom on dating apps, who sees which posts
on Facebook, and which hashtags go viral on Twitter. Platforms do this by mining your
networked engagement and comparing it to others that have inhabited the network
before you. This is what I see as the deepest recess of the user unconscious, where
digital traces from the cloud, “no matter how disavowed, are becoming an intimate part
of the I” (2018b, p. xxxii).
As a vastly distributed, massively networked, and eminently affective mode of
thought, the user unconscious belies the conceit that humans can think in more complex
and creative ways than computational media. As such, it points to more than an
economic mode of analysis hiding social death within it. It points to the coupling of
users with an affective milieu that embeds trauma in algorithms governing the defining
edge of sociality today: impetuous transgressions of the personal and the networked
necessitated by today’s promiscuously connected machines (Chun, 2016; Clough,
2018b, p. XXII).
While Clough does not invoke Freud in her elaboration of the user unconscious,
the preceding discussion has sought to situate his notion of the death drive within it.
Both the death drive and biopolitics dissolve social cohesion and the autopoietic body,

leaving dividual competition modulated by undulating networks of affective flows in
their place – vast networks of turbulent data churning up sociality via speculating
algorithms. But as life today is understood to be in a constant state of flux, with minute
changes constantly reverberating through open, non-equilibrium systems, it is
imperative to go beyond normative assumptions about life and death, stability and
volatility, order and disorder to critique biopolitics. Seeing the death drive and
biopolitics as working in tandem to create traumatic thoughts within the user
unconscious is meant to render the opacity of platforms a bit clearer, alerting us to the
uncanny return of disavowed thoughts we are being used to create, largely against our
conscious wishes.
To see why the uncanny provides a critical contribution to the user unconscious,
one must recall Freud’s essay outlining its essential features (2003). He first tells us that
our typical understanding of the word is incomplete, that there is nothing particularly
uncanny when inanimate things seem to come alive. Indeed, he quickly dismisses the
mechanical dolls considered uncanny when he was writing as unworthy of the term.
This is because he saw the uncanny as stemming from long repressed modes of thought
that were threatening to return (2003, p. 147).
As was the case a century ago, I would like to propose that there is a repressed
mode of thought threating to return today. And as with Freud, I see it as having little to
do with things being on the verge of springing to life. Far from instilling ominous
foreboding, the liveliness of things is a mundane fact of life today. And as much as we
are encouraged to think of our machines as magically assembling things into
synchronized swarms, optimized flows, and turbocharged equilibria, few of my
respondents bought into this techno-utopian hype. Today, the uncanny return of

repressed modes of thought comes from algorithms stringing engagement most people
would not consider problematic into profitable milieus that most people would.
So the critical import of seeing the user unconscious as uncanny is not that it
alerts us to the disequilibrium of biopolitics, nor that life is always tinged with death.
These are tenets of today’s neoliberal zeitgeist, central to our techno-utopian ideology
presenting creative destruction, disruptive innovation, and turbulent data as crucial to
the capacity of platforms to add value to users’ lives. The critical import of seeing the
user unconscious as uncanny is that it allows us to uncover repressed modes of
disavowed thoughts undergirding algorithmic media, machine learning, and artificial
intelligence.
Freud’s psychanalytic project has been characterized as a conservative force,
making the strange familiar by rendering anomalous thought processes intelligible
against the backdrop of a family drama (Fisher, 2018, p. 10). Indeed, psychoanalysis
has often been complicit in creating subjects in the image of dominant social forces,
most recently lending its energies to the child-rearing concerns central to neoliberalism
(Rozmarin, 2020). But beneath this conservatism is a countervailing move, a move that
renders the familiar strange, our most cherished memories as screens covering events
too traumatic to remember having lived. Freud’s notion of the uncanny recursively
couples these two movements. It estranges us from the familiar narratives we tell about
ourselves while revealing our thoughts to be abhorrent in an all too familiar way.
Highlighting this uncanny coupling allows for the affective registration of the return of
thoughts we have long prided ourselves on overcoming but that algorithmic media
implicate us within again.
I explore this framework more concretely in the discussion and conclusion,
turning next to the method used for this research.

Method
This analysis is based on fifty interviews taken in 2017 for an exploratory investigation
into dating apps. I found these respondents through snowball sampling, starting with my
own networks on social media and branching out from there. The average age of the
sample was thirty-two years old, and they had all used at least one dating platform.
There were twenty men, thirty women, thirty White, twenty people of colour, forty
straight, and ten who were not straight in the sample. Five respondents were working in
the online-dating industry: analysing data, consulting app creators, coaching online
daters, making a documentary about online dating, and marketing a dating website.
The interviews were open-ended and took place in bars and coffee shops in New
York City. In them, I fist asking about any differences my respondents found between
dates they had encountered through dating platforms and those they had found through
other means. I then asked about any differences they saw between the various platforms
they had used, memorable dates or relationships they had made through them, what they
would like to see changed on them, and anything else they found interesting about their
experiences using them.
About two-thirds of my respondents showed me their profile on at least one app
they were using. While they did this, I asked them to tell me how they felt about their
profile, why they had chosen the pictures they had put on them, and what they were
thinking about while writing their “bios.” After going over their profile with them, I had
them swipe on about twenty profiles, asking them to tell me why they had swiped left or
right. Nine of my respondents let me look at some of the messages they had sent and
received. On average, the interviews took fifty-six minutes. The longest was two hours
and four minutes, while the shortest was twenty-two minutes. I recorded and transcribed
all of them.

I explore two interrelated themes that came up in those interviews below: first,
the strangely compelling drive to swipe induced by swipe apps; and second, the racial
preferences amplified by them.

Findings: the racist swipe drive
The drive to swipe
The first dating app for touchscreen phones with general appeal was Tinder. 2 Created in
2012, by 2015 it was the most popular dating platform available (Ansari & Klinenberg,
2016). Tinder’s success is partially due to the swipe interface it introduced, where users
are presented with a stack of photos to swipe right on if they want to connect and left on
if they do not. This photo can be tapped to show more pictures and a brief space for text
known as a “bio.” Some users leave this space blank, while others write a few words,
emojis, or sentences to give their profile some flair. Only users that both swipe right on
each other can exchange messages.
When I began interviewing in 2017, Tinder had already swept through the dateo-sphere – the rapidly evolving ecology of dating platforms (Slater, 2013) – and some
new apps were becoming increasingly popular. Tinder, OkCupid, Bumble, Coffee
Meets Bagel, Hinge, and The League were the most popular platforms used by my
respondents. Most of them were using more than one app, and they generally viewed
them as an inevitable part of dating today. Many of the apps they were using are seen as
Tinder clones because they copied its minimalistic aesthetic and signature feature –
swiping.
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Grindr was successful in the gay community three years prior to this.

Swipe apps move the initial decision of whom to pursue from deliberate
searches to visceral swiping. This is likely to alter what is captured by them and what
can be coupled with the habits of their users. A key finding from my research is that
many of my respondents described swiping as addicting because matching with others
felt like a jolt of recognition. For instance, Jane was worried she was swiping as a
substitute for a relationship. She says:
I did Tinder, but I only did that as a diversion. I never met up with anyone. It was
just like playing a game. – Was it fun at all? (my words are bold) – I think it was
just a substitute for having a relationship and not really being ready to date. – So
you got enjoyment out of matching with someone? – I did. I would say there
was probably like a pleasure in, hmm, how many people might be attracted to my
profile. – And then did you talk to anyone? – On Tinder, no.

While Jane got pleasure from playing Tinder like a game, this did not lead to the
superficial hookups some have proposed it would (David & Cambre, 2016). Tinder was
seen as a game by my respondents strictly in the sense quoted above, without implying
anything beyond the interface. Nevertheless, the excitement of matching was readily
apparent during my interviews. Jane even equated it to a shot of dopamine:
I would swipe right. I would like him. It’s a match! – Look at you. He’s probably
going to say hi to you, and then you can ignore him like you do most of the
people. – Yeah, you got it. – Haha, but that was fun. At least he matched with
you. – Yes, seriously. That is like dopamine. I’m like, “Great we matched! That’s
enough for today.”

Swiping for the dopamine is a far cry from looking for a substantial connection, but the
immediate validation users got from a match was hard for them to resist. Hilary
explains:
I mostly just swipe and don’t answer people that message me. It’s just like for
validation. – What kind of validation do you get from it? – I guess if people like

you, they consider you attractive or whatever. And like dudes mostly swipe right
on everyone I think, so it’s not like real validation.

While Hilary considered the validation she got from a match to be unreal, she continued
to swipe as though it was real. Similarly, Tom said the dopamine rush from a mutual
like was sometimes all he used Tinder for:
Some people are on Tinder just for the dopamine. They’re just like, “Oh cool!” and
then like they’re done. And then that’s it. And they just want to be liked. I have
done that sometimes. Like, “Ahhhh! I don’t know why I’m swiping! I’ve had days
where I’m like, “Swipe, swipe, swipe, swipe right. Everyone swipe right.” And I’m
like, “Am I ugly? No! I’m not! OK!” And then that’s it.

As Tom suggests, swiping can activate dopamine centers in the brain, making it very
addicting. Similarly, Lucy explained that she had tried to stop using multiple times,
saying “It can become a bit addictive. And I have deleted it. Like I don’t know if that.
Like off and on deleting and then reinstating it.” Swiping is addicting because it feels
like a game of chance, with a match creating a burst of excitement designed to hook
users on the app. Jenny felt this game-like aspect was probably why her matches rarely
bothered to text her:
If I get matches, the likelihood that somebody messages me or that I message them
is very low. I think people are just playing the game, playing it like a game. But
then they’re like, “Fuck, I don’t want to do.” I think everyone’s gone through the
whole thing, and either it worked out and they met someone, or they just got really
discouraged.

As these users suggest, swipe apps may have been too addicting for their own good.
They were soon overrun by compulsively swiping users that rarely bothered to engage
in verbal communication at all.

This compulsive swiping seemed nonsensical to many of my respondents. For
instance, Stacy considered the whole process to be really weird, explaining that she
mostly uses them “out of boredom. It’s so stupid. It’s a mindless, pointless act.”
Likewise, Mandy displayed a pretty common paradox, exclaiming her aversion to swipe
apps, while continuing to use: “I’m telling you, Tinder and Bumble I can’t. I hate them
so. – Did you meet anyone from Tinder and Bumble? – This guy is from Tinder. The
one I’m going to meet today. – Oh, OK.” She is clearly fed up with swipe apps, yet
continues to spend time and energy to make them work. As users swipe against their
own better judgement, the swipe drive can be activated by the flick of a thumb, leading
to long hours of swiping, streams of messages, and multiple dates a day.
While my respondents generally took their compulsive use to be a mindless bit
of fun or aggravation, few linked this engagement to networked flows of affect
distributed by speculating algorithms. This is a key feature of the user unconscious,
which seeks to downplay the way individual use is linked to networked effects. As this
paper is meant to render this link more discernible, I turn next to a problematic effect of
this dynamic: the linking of users’ racial preferences to the value assessed to users on
swipe apps.

The racial preferences of my respondents
Many of my respondents rejected profiles during the interactive portion of my
interviews because of looks. They said their potential dates looked too short, ugly, fat,
feminine, etc. This made them seem superficial. But having them swipe during the
interview probably led them to make superficial assessments, as there is little besides
looks to base swiping decisions on.
Race was one of many reasons my respondents cited for swiping left or right.
Determining if racial preferences for selecting a date is problematic would run counter

to the theoretical framework I have been arguing for in this paper: that is, a time when
we could think in terms of personal preference is gone. Indeed, the notion that personal
preferences should be considered independently from their networked effects seems to
be central to today’s techo-utopian ideology, which looks to sever the link between the
personal and the networked in the minds of users while requiring the transgression of
that link in every use. Rather than focus on individual acts, then, I am looking to detail
how these preferences are worked into and coupled with networked flows of affect. This
connection is made more explicitly in the discussion section, but as the basis for that
discussion, I outline a few of my respondents reasons for their racial preferences below.
I begin with Jenny to illustrate the extent to which I had to prompt my
respondents to describe why they were swiping left or right on profiles. Jenny is more
forthcoming than a lot of my respondents, most of whom found it exceedingly hard to
convey, or even know, why they were swiping left or right. She says,
The time when I downloaded Tinder during spring break, I downloaded Coffee
Meets Bagel as well. I didn't like it. – Why? – It was just all nerdy Asian guys –
Do you have a certain criteria for who you would like to date or is it kind of
General. – I mean you are seeing the people I am swiping on. They are all very,
very different. – Can we do this exercise really quick to just see how you are
swiping? [Here I am reiterating the fact that I want Jenny to tell me why she
is swiping left or right instead swiping silently] – I would swipe left because. –
The first picture? What is wrong with it? – I just don't like that. It is like part of
his face. – Oh because it's like the side of his face? – Yeah. and he's not smiling
too. – This next one is smiling. – I don't like this one. I don't know. I'm just not
into. – You can see more of his face. – his look. – Any particular part of the
look that you don’t like? Or you just can't explain it? – Yeah, I just don't like
that at all. – Like the sunglasses are too flashy or something? – I don't like the
beard [swipe left]. – Okay, that makes sense. [She swipes left on another
profile]. Another guy with a beard? – No, it's just not attractive to me [swipe
left]. Him neither [swipe left]. – Not him either? – Not him either [swipe left]. –
You seem to swipe a lot to the left. – Yeah, if there is no picture then definitely

not, this one is like Blurry. – He is blurry? – He looks like kind of smart though,
so I will look. – [She taps the profile picture to see more photos]. Okay, he has
glasses, looks like a dancer. – Oh, that's weird, no. Yeah, no [swipe left]. – No? –
No. Sunglasses you can't really see. I just feel like they have something to hide,
you know? [swipe left] – If they have sunglasses? Okay. – No, he has a kid, even
though he might say ‘that’s my nephew,’ I still won’t [swipe left]. – Even though,
eh? – This one is all blurry. I don't like his sunglasses [swipe left]. – What's with
the sunglasses on all of these guys? – I just don't like it. – Yes, I understand. I
don't know why people would put sunglasses on their first picture. – Not
attracted to black guys [swipe left]. – Okay. – I don't know. I don't like how he
looks. Don't like him [swipe left]. Don't like him [swipe left]. Why are they giving
me such bum guys? – I don't know. – Wait I think I know that guy [swipe left].
Nope [swipe left]. Nope [swipe left]. Nope [swipe left]. – Wow. – Like, Tinder is
really hard.

In this exchange, it is clear that Jenny found it difficult to articulate why she was
swiping left on profiles. This was the case with many of those that I interviewed. To me,
this indicates that they were not accustomed to thinking about their swiping decisions,
at least not in a verbal way. This illustrates one way in which Tinder’s interface primes
users for absent-minded engagement in which unconscious racism can flourish.
Mindlessly swiping on profiles allows race to influence one’s swiping decisions
in a less direct way than checking a box to indicate one’s preference, making it seem
less racist. For instance, Julia first explains that she has a racial preference, saying:
You can tell the Tinder rating by who you are receiving, and I would say that I
don’t like the fact that I have a racial preference, but I do. And it would be mainly
white men, second mainly Asian men, but mostly white men, and I wasn’t
receiving that many.

Julia gave up on Tinder because she wasn’t receiving the kinds of users she preferred.
But this did not lead her to an interface that would allow her to filter for race by
checking a box. She explains,

I wasn’t using Tinder because I specifically wanted to find somebody, and it was
only to try it out for fun. So I think if I was kind of looking more seriously, then I
would research it and look into other apps. But I don’t have much knowledge of
them. I just know that they exist, but not that much. – Yeah because some of them
allow you to say that “I want black men or white men or whatever.” – At the
same time, even though I do have a preference, I would feel bad about discounting
people because my preference isn’t exclusive. It’s just a preference. But I’ve also
met people who do not fit my preferences and have liked them or dated them or
whatever.

Julia’s racial preferences are fairly complex. She is Indian and was living in NYC when
I interviewed her. She knows that she will eventually have to find someone from the
same Indian background as herself in order to be accepted by her family, but while she
is dating casually, she is looking to date outside of her race. While Julia was open to
dating all races, however, she detected a racial hierarchy embedded in the recommender
system itself. That is, the racial hierarchy of preferences she was not proud of seemed to
be reflected back on her as a person of colour in terms of the likes she was receiving.
Grace also explained a similar hierarchy of racial attraction discernible in the
messages one is likely to get:
If you are like a 10, you might get a call from each and every person on the site,
but if you are a seven and a half, maybe you will not get messages from, say,
Asians or whites. I got a lot of hits, interestingly enough, from black men.

Grace felt that racial preferences were more important on swipe apps because they put
looks front and centre:
It is not people being racist. Maybe it’s just their attraction, which is different for
different races. If you’re purely going by the looks factor and not counting the
personality factor, a lot of people are attracted to, say, blonde women versus
Asians versus Indians, and maybe black women are lower. If we are on the list, we
are on the list for some fun, but not for some serious relationship, you know?

While Grace acknowledges that having a racial preference does not make one racist, Jon
notes that he is conflicted about wanting to filter for race on dating apps:
I would add like a filter. I mean, if you could filter people, then I would, definitely.
Because as of now, for Tinder, really, the only filters is male, female, age, location,
distance, and that’s pretty much it. So if I had to add something. I mean, dude,
that’s weird, because what if I say I prefer whites or Asians? That’s kind of. –
Well, a lot of apps have that. – Really? – Yeah. – I didn’t know that. Because on
some level, that seems racist. – Hahaha. – Right? – On some level, yeah.

As Jon and Julia make clear, there is a sense that filtering for race by clicking a button is
more racist than simply swiping according to one’s racial preferences. In the following
discussion I look to unpack this common assumption.

Discussion:
The interviews quoted above illustrate how swipe apps prime users to mindlessly swipe,
compelling them to privilege looks above other qualities and making race a more salient
factor in their swiping decisions. In this discussion, I explain why this drive to swipe
should not be dissociated from the uncanny user unconscious. I do this by detailing how
swiping becomes recursively coupled with speculating algorithms on swipe apps. To
flesh this out, I compare OkCupid’s match percentage to Tinder’s “attractiveness” scale.
While both of these systems are still used, I argue that the move many of my
respondents made from dating websites to apps points to a more general shift in the
data-o-sphere for three reasons: First, my respondents considered dating apps to have
supplanted dating websites; second, OkCupid’s user interface has become more like
Tinder’s over the past five years, with many now using its swipe app; and third, the
match percentage is no longer as central to OkCupid’s recommender system as it once
was. Tinder’s user interface and recommender system can thus be seen as partially

supplanting OkCupid’s, both because of its popularity and because its business model
has been copied by many other dating apps, including OkCupid’s. Understanding why
Tinder’s recommender system is likely to amplify racially biased outcomes is thus
important because it indicates the trajectory the date-o-sphere seems to be heading.
Tinder’s recommender system is likely to amplify racially biased outcomes
because it uses an “attractiveness” scale based on pooled preferences to recommend
users to each other. This is different from OkCupid’s match3 percentage, which is
calculated using an algorithm that incorporates hundreds of multiple-choice questions
that users answer. Users can also determine which questions to answer, how much
weight to give each question, and how they want their matches to answer questions.
On the other hand, Tinder has admitted to recommending users through an Eloinspired “attractiveness” score based on the ratio of right to left swipes they receive
(“Powering Tinder®”, 2019). Elo-scores rank people in competitive, zero-sum games
like chess. On swipe apps, a user’s score would go down every time they “lost” a
swiping event: for instance, if they swiped right on someone that later swiped left on
them. Swiping right on users with lower attractiveness scores would also decrease one’s
score, leading to fewer, “less-attractive,” and slower recommendations. Measuring users
in this way does not sit well with the notion that attraction can be idiosyncratic. It
marginalizes those who are not attractive to a majority of other users. And it
incentivizes a competitive approach to dating.
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OkCupid’s match percentage can still be used as its recommender system, but it is no longer
its default system, and the ease of swiping on its app has habituated users to using it in the
absent-minded way I detailed above. I mention it here to show how different it is from
swipe app recommender systems and to highlight the fact that the transition to swiping is
likely to amplify racially biased outcomes in the date-o-sphere.

Tinder’s attractiveness scale is thus likely to lead to very different outcomes
than OkCupid’s match algorithm. Instead of matching users on an individual basis using
hundreds of different variables, it employs a hierarchical ranking system based on how
often profiles are liked or rejected. So my argument is not that there are people who
have racial preferences, disavowed racial preferences, or unconscious racial preferences
on swipe apps. This is obvious. And as Benjamin has warned, focusing on individual
racism often distracts us from the subtle ways racial bias gets embedded in code (2019).
My argument is that using a hierarchical ranking system based on looks to recommend
users to each other embeds each one of these levels – from outright racism to
unconscious preferences – into it. In fact, even if people merely prefer to date their own
race, pooled attractiveness scores would disadvantage racial minorities simply if fewer
of them were using the app. On swipe apps, then, the zero-sum game being played is
decidedly not like chess: it amplifies a racial hierarchy of users by assessing them
according to pooled preferences and using those assessments as the basis for
recommendations.
The move to swipe apps thus dovetails with neoliberal methods of measure that
Foucault has outlined (2010): it amplifies minute differences in society by turning
everything into a competition, ranking people according to how they fare in those
competitions, and allocating resources according to those rankings. By putting users in
direct competition with each other, ranking them on a single dimension, and measuring
attraction as a zero-sum game, they put race to work as grist for algorithms distributing
affect according each user’s presumed capacity to generate a profit. In this way, they
increase the salience of race as a factor of success in today’s dating games, even when
race is not used as a parameter in their recommender systems, most people are open to

dating all races, and user’s do not know their swiping decisions are being used to create
a racial hierarchy of “attractiveness.”
So while algorithms on dating platforms have been critiqued as mere marketing
ploys (Finkel et al., 2012; Joel et al., 2017b), we should not stop at this critique. The
way they facilitate connections, order profiles, and distribute likes matters, precisely
because they do not work as advertised. More than merely validate or invalidate one’s
sense of self-worth, they influence whether users will get matches in the future and with
whom those matches will be with, as well as who continues to use them and who does
not.
As persons of colour, Julie and Grace understood swipe apps to be rigged
against them because of the matches, recommendations, and messages they received. As
Julie put it, “you can tell the Tinder rating by who you are receiving,” and she was not
seeing the men she preferred to meet. It might be tempting to think that the racial
preferences Julia and Grace have, preferring Asian and white over black men, negate
the claim I am making that swipe apps disenfranchise them. But this would be to shift
the focus back on the personal choices that people make. To be clear, there is absolutely
no reason to tether personal preference for certain races to biased outcomes on
platforms; rather, it is the user interfaces and algorithmic sorting mechanisms of swipe
apps that create a milieu in which unconscious racial biases get embed in the networks
they set in motion. The comparison between OkCupid’s match percentage and Tinder’s
“attractiveness” scale makes it clear that personal preferences can be put to use by
algorithms in very different ways.
Insofar as swipe apps encourage the disassociation of personal choices from
networked effects in the minds of users, they conform to two key feature of the user
unconscious: first, “the separation of the personal and the networked is more imagined

than actual;” and second, this imagined separation invites users “to be caught in public
acting privately” (Clough, 2018a, p. 77). This ideological severing of the personal from
the networked is an effect of the swipe drive, where users are encouraged to swipe for
the dopamine even when they consider this to be a “mindless, pointless act,” as Stacy
put it. Precisely because swiping feels mindless and pointless, it is easy to sift through
dozens of profiles a minute without thinking about why one is swiping left or right. The
litany of left swipes quoted from my interview with Jenny indicates how race can make
its way into one’s swiping decisions, almost as an afterthought. After all, race came up
in just one of a few dozen of her swiping decisions, along with other superficial reasons
for swiping left – wearing sunglasses, having a picture with one’s nephew, or not liking
someone’s face, for example. It should also be noted that much of the feedback I
received during the swiping part of my interviews came after much prompting. To me,
this indicates that my respondents were not accustomed to articulating, or even thinking
about, why they were swiping left or right. It is thus unlikely that their swiping
decisions would have been consciously thought out had I not been prompting them to
express why they were swiping left or right.
The mindless swiping that swipe apps encourage makes it easier to engage them
without thinking about the implications of one’s swiping decisions. Circumventing
deliberate thought processes on swipe apps is also easier because no box needs to be
checked to indicate one is looking for certain races. In contrast to swiping, clicking a
box to filter for race “seems racist,” as Jon rightfully notes. Thus, filtering by swiping
makes it easier for users to distance themselves from their racial preferences. This is
alluded to by Crystal, who notes that she would not check a box to filter for race even if,
as she says, “my mind would have been thinking it. Or even if I had it written on a piece
of paper.” Likewise, Julie is able to mindlessly swipe according to her personal

preference for certain races on Tinder without having to “feel bad about discounting
people.”
While it is not clear if having a preference to date a certain race over another is
racist, it has been well documented that users of dating websites have such preferences
(Alhabash et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014; Lin & Lundquist, 2013; Rudder, 2015).
So swipe apps do not make people more racist. Rather, they provide a context in which
unconscious racial biases can flourish because they can be expressed without troubling
users’ self-perceptions of themselves as being non-racist. These are contexts in which
the aversive racism widespread today is exacerbated (Dovidio et al., 2016). In other
words, swipe apps create highly suitable milieus for unconscious forms of racism to be
amplified by networked flows of affect.
Risking oversimplification for added clarity, we might think of right swipes as
positive affects looking to connect and left swipes as negative ones to disconnect, as I
mentioned in the theoretical framework of this paper. These affects can then be set in
motion by recommender systems looking to generate a profit. In general, these systems
make connections quickly and frequently for those amassing a lot of right swipes or
who simply pay for those connections. This can be seen as linked to a libidinous
impulse within society, what Freud saw as “eros”. The obverse of this would then be
users that amass a lot of left swipes and are ignored by recommender systems. They are
left to suffer a slow social death, relegated to the bottom of the stack of profiles that
others swipe through. The pooled preferences that swipe apps amplify thus ensure social
death undergirds the perpetuation of privilege, making it easier for a select few to find
sexual satisfaction, intimacy, and love.
In the beginning of this paper, I mentioned Noble’s (2018) claim that by opening
up the black box of algorithmic media we could “transform the consciousness

embedded in artificial intelligence, since it is in fact, in part, a product of our own
collective creation” (p. 29). This is a laudable goal. But as she also notes, algorithmic
media cannot be disentangled from the primitive accumulation at the root of capitalism
(Couldry & Mejias, 2019), financial futures devised to speculate upon black bodies
during the slave trade (Keeling, 2019), and structural racism in the criminal justice
system (Alexander, 2012). These roots of racial capitalism are now embedded in a new
Jim code (Benjamin, 2019), where algorithms of oppression (Noble, 2018) perpetuate
quotidian violence against black futures (Keeling, 2019). As these theorists make clear,
racist practices, systems, and ways of thinking we often pride ourselves on having
moved beyond as a society – slavery, Jim Crow, segregation, bigotry, xenophobia, etc. –
have a tendency to erupt into public attention only to be hidden deeper within social
structures soon after. Today they are embedded in algorithmic code animating a user
unconscious. While the metaphor of the black box and calls for transparency are
needed, then, seeing this user unconscious as repressing the unseemly side of algorithms
sheds light on why those calls are rarely heeded, rendering concrete the quandary
algorithmic media present us with today.
Part of the promise of algorithmic media is that they could allow us to overcome
injustices felt most acutely at intersections of race, class, gender, ability, and sexuality
by circumventing human prejudice. But they often lead to more inequitable outcomes
than human decision-making had. The common assumption that algorithms are
intelligent is thus only possible because their unintelligence is hidden. That is,
algorithmic media are opaque precisely because this allows the inequity amplified by
them to be repressed, keeping the social death of those they systematically marginalize
again and again from public scrutiny. Repressing the racial hierarchy of attraction swipe
apps amplify, the user unconscious hides the historical trauma they perpetuate within

impenetrable jumbles of code, preventing the traumatic return of racial bias from
gumming up their continued seamless generation of profits.

Conclusion
This paper has outlined an increasingly salient quandary algorithmic media presents to
socially conscious scholars, users, and creators: as their oppression is decried with
heightened alarm, they continue to sever the loop of the conscious self from speculating
algorithms (Hansen, 2015), human understanding from machine learning (Hayles,
2017), and AI from the user unconscious. By capturing, calculating, and manipulating
unconscious processes, they make it difficult to see where resistance to the oppression
they amplify might come.
Capturing vast troves of data from the inattentive performativity of users,
today’s algorithms work to mine the depths of unconscious desire for profitable
extraction. Swipe apps are at the cusp of this data logic. They turn the intractable
messiness of intimacy into grist for algorithms carving up users according to their
presumed profitability or lack thereof. They thus constitute a quintessential example of
the way population racism is amplified today: by capturing and recursively coupling
users’ digital traces of desire with carefully calibrated affective flows.
While Freud had described the entropic drive within us as bringing us ever
closer to death, this drive can now be seen as animating the shadowy agency of a user
unconscious within algorithmic media. Working through swipe apps to compel, amass,
and agglomerate digital traces of desire, this unconscious affords social connection,
engagement, and intimacy for some only against an underlying amplification of social
death for others. It can thus be seen as the latest formation perpetuating the ideological
roots of capitalism – bigotry, xenophobia, racism, etc. – by embedding them in
impenetrable jumbles of code. Repressing these disturbing modes of distributed

thought, the user unconscious prevents the quotidian violence platforms implicate users
within from gumming up their continued seamless generation of profits.
Donna Haraway once said, “our machines are disturbingly lively, and we
ourselves frighteningly inert” (1990, p. 152). But a time when we could think of “our
machines” or “we ourselves” is past. We entail machines, just as machines entail us.
Indeed, that disturbingly lively ghost in the machine – uncannily repeating past
traumatic modes of thought again and again – is us as we become users. Haunted by
disavowed traces of desire and animated by speculating algorithms, we are incessantly
rendered as so much digital grist for algorithmic media to mine for profits despite the all
too familiar way those profits are made.
If these algorithms are to be resisted, new tools must be devised to gain some
purchase on the affective milieus they set in motion. My hope is the lens of the uncanny
user unconscious proves useful as one such tool. Estranging us from the familiar
narratives we tell about ourselves while revealing our thoughts to be abhorrent in an all
too familiar way, it enables the affective registration of distributed thoughts disavowed
by the very users they are created from and coupled with. It might thus assist those
working to envision protocols of engagement more likely to mitigate than amplify
social inequity.
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